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Verizon’s “Certification Process” and Why the FCC 
Needs To Take a Stand 
P.J. GRETTER* 
INTRODUCTION 
Jeff Jarvis is quite upset with Verizon Wireless, and he has a right to be.1 In 
September 2013, Google released its newest tablet, dubbed the Nexus 7. Mr. Jarvis 
was one of the first consumers to get the tablet, and he quickly took it to a Verizon 
Wireless store to obtain a SIM card to activate the tablet on Verizon’s 4G Long Term 
Evolution (LTE) Network.2 Much to Mr. Jarvis’s dismay, the Verizon store 
employees notified him that the tablet could not be activated on the Verizon Network 
“because the IMEI numbers weren’t added to Verizon’s system”3—for reference, an 
IMEI number is a “15 or 17 digit unique number to identify mobile devices.”4 
Following his frustrating visit to the Verizon store, Mr. Jarvis voiced his irritation 
by publicly calling out the wireless company on Twitter, writing, “Knock, knock, 
@VZWSupport, is anybody there? I’m trying to give you money. You’re making it 
hard. No, impossible.” He also provided a link to a more in-depth rant on his personal 
Google Plus page.5 Verizon Wireless responded through its company Twitter page a 
day later, tweeting, “I’m excited you got your Nexus 7 but not all LTE tablets are 
created equal. It’s not part of our lineup & can’t be activated.”6 The problem, 
however, was that the Nexus 7 could be activated on Verizon’s network.7 Jarvis 
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 1. See Jeff Jarvis, TelHell Thus Far, BUZZMACHINE (Sept. 19, 2013), 
http://buzzmachine.com/2013/09/19/telhell-thus-far/ (discussing Verizon’s “crime” of not 
allowing Jarvis to activate his Nexus 7 on its 4G LTE Network). 
 2. E.g., Kevin Parrish, Verizon Answering to FCC Over Nexus 7 “Block,” TOM’S 
HARDWARE (Sept. 22, 2013, 11:00 AM), http://www.tomshardware.com/news/nexus-7-verizon
-fcc-4g-lte-open-access-rules,24346.html. 
 3. Id. 
 4. What Is IMEI Number?, IMEI TOOLS, http://imei-number.com/what-is-imei-number/. 
 5. Jeff Jarvis, TWITTER (Sept. 16, 2013, 12:00 PM), https://twitter.com/jeffjarvis/status
/379681316931108864. 
 6. VZW Support, TWITTER (Sept. 17, 2013, 5:35 AM), https://twitter.com/VZWSupport
/status/379946773730443264. 
 7. Parrish, supra note 2. 
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proved this by removing a currently activated Verizon 4G LTE SIM8 card from his 
Chromebook Pixel, placing it in his Nexus 7, and showing that the tablet did indeed 
function properly on Verizon’s LTE network.9 
Verizon’s dismissive response to Jarvis’s complaint, accompanied by Jarvis’s 
realization that the tablet could run on the network—but that Verizon was not ready 
to allow it—led Jarvis to file a complaint with the FCC.10 Jarvis based his complaint 
on the open-access rules that Verizon agreed to abide by when it purchased the 
700-megahertz (MHz) C-Block spectrum to operate its 4G LTE network in 2008.11 
To support his claim, Jarvis cited language from § 27.16 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations, which states, in part, “[Verizon] shall not deny, limit, or restrict the 
ability of their customers to use the devices and applications of their choice on 
[Verizon’s] C Block network.”12 Jarvis’s social-media bashings and formal FCC 
complaint resulted in Verizon issuing a statement that cited its “rigorous”13 
certification process for all devices attempting to run on its 4G LTE network.14 The 
wireless company pointed to its publicly laid-out certification process,15 claiming 
that it generally takes four to six weeks to complete.16 Verizon argued that the process 
was in place to “guard[] the safety and security of [its] network,”17 a direct (albeit 
uncited) reference to § 27.16(b)(1) of the C-Block rules, which allowed Verizon to 
establish technical standards “reasonably necessary for the . . . protection of [its] 
network.”18 Then, in an even more peculiar turn of events, Verizon released a 
statement at the beginning of November, blaming Google and Asus (joint 
manufacturers of the Nexus 7) for the fact that the tablet still could not be activated 
on Verizon’s network because of a “systems issue.”19 Verizon told the public that 
                                                                                                                 
 
 8. SIM is an acronym for the phrase “Subscriber Identity Module”; SIM cards are used 
to identify mobile phone subscribers. See What Does SIM CARD Mean?, 
INTERNETSLANG.COM, http://www.internetslang.com/SIM_20CARD-meaning-definition.asp. 
 9. Parrish, supra note 2. 
 10. Id. 
 11. See FCC, Auction 73: 700 MHz Band, FCC.GOV, http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions
/default.htm?job=auction_summary&id=73 (last updated June 19, 2012); Matthew Lasar, 
Verizon: We Promise To Honor the Block C Open Access Rules, ARS TECHNICA (May 7, 2008, 
7:12 PM), http://arstechnica.com/uncategorized/2008/05/verizon-we-promise-to-honor-the-
block-c-open-access-rules/. 
 12. 47 C.F.R. § 27.16(b) (2013); see also Jeff Jarvis, My FCC Complaint Against Verizon, 
GOOGLE PLUS (Sept. 18, 2013), https://plus.google.com/+JeffJarvis/posts/WfZVMTjJ1N7. 
 13. Kellex, Verizon Further Explains Nexus 7 LTE Debacle, Blames 4–6 Week 
Certification Process, DROID LIFE (Sept. 18, 2013), http://www.droid-life.com/2013/09/18
/verizon-further-explains-nexus-7-lte-debacle-blames-4-6-week-certification-process/. 
 14. Id. 
 15. See VERIZON WIRELESS, OPEN DEVELOPMENT DEVICE CERTIFICATION PROCESS (2010), 
available at https://odi-device.verizonwireless.com/Info/Open%20Development%20Device
%20Docs/Certification%20Process%20Documentation/ODDeviceCertificationProcess.pdf. 
 16. Lance Whitney, Verizon: Google Nexus 7 LTE Support Is Coming. Really, CNET 
(Sept. 19, 2013, 5:52 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1035_3-57603624-94/verizon-google
-nexus-7-lte-support-is-coming-really/ (quoting a public statement released by Verizon). 
 17. Id. 
 18. 47 C.F.R. § 27.16(b)(1) (2013). 
 19. Sean Hollister, Verizon Won’t Activate the Nexus 7 Until Google Delivers a KitKat 
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“Google and Asus asked Verizon to suspend its certification process until Google’s 
new OS [operating system] was available on the Nexus 7,” and that was why the 
tablet still could not be activated.20 
 However, the whole situation is somewhat suspicious, and the certification 
process, as a whole, still raises concerns, regardless of Verizon’s latest explanation. 
After all, the tablet ran on the Verizon network (as shown by Jarvis),21 and you could 
obtain a SIM card for the tablet from AT&T or T-Mobile on the day of the tablet’s 
release.22 Furthermore, Verizon admitted it received the tablet for testing in August—
so why was it still not cleared for activation in the latter part of September?23 There 
are two main issues that arise out of this ordeal: (1) whether this lengthy certification 
process violates the C-Block rules,24 and (2) whether other considerations (discussed 
infra) should forbid the certification process. 
This Note will give an in-depth review of the legality and policy implications of 
Verizon’s lengthy certification process. Part I will give a short background of the 
time leading up to Verizon’s purchase of the C-Block. It will then review the actual 
rules of the agreement between Verizon and the FCC at the time of the purchase, as 
well as the pertinent history following the purchase. Part II will analyze whether 
Verizon’s lengthy certification process violates the C-Block rules or the general spirit 
of Verizon’s agreement to abide by the rules. Part III will then argue that, even if 
Verizon’s certification process does not violate the original rules of the agreement, 
recent developments and various public policy considerations should preclude 
Verizon from stalling before allowing various devices onto its network. Finally, Part 
IV will conclude with a proposal on how the FCC should handle this certification-
process problem going forward. 
I. VERIZON’S PURCHASE OF THE C-BLOCK AND THE RESTRICTIONS 
THAT CAME WITH IT 
A. Verizon’s Purchase of the C-Block 
On August 23, 2007, the FCC issued a notice seeking public comments on the 
competitive bidding procedures for an upcoming spectrum auction.25 Following a 
brief comment period, the FCC issued another notice proclaiming that the auction 
                                                                                                                 
 
Update, VERGE (Nov. 6, 2013, 8:08 PM), http://www.theverge.com/2013/11/6/5075028
/verizon-wont-activate-the-nexus-7-until-google-delivers-a-kitkat. 
 20. Id. It should be noted that the tablet finally became active on Verizon’s network on 
February 13, 2014, nearly six months after the tablet was released to the general public. Sarah 
Silbert, Verizon Will Offer Google’s Nexus 7 Tablet Starting This Thursday, ENGADGET (Feb. 
10, 2014, 3:18 PM), http://www.engadget.com/2014/02/10/verizon-nexus-7-tablet-on-sale/. 
 21. See supra text accompanying notes 7–8. 
 22. Parrish, supra note 2. 
 23. Id. 
 24. See, e.g., Karl Bode, Don’t Expect FCC To Act on Verizon’s Snub of Nexus 7, 
DSLREPORTS.COM (Sept. 19, 2013, 12:10 PM), http://www.dslreports.com/shownews/Dont
-Expect-FCC-to-Act-on-Verizons-Snub-of-Nexus-7-125887. 
 25. Auction of 700 MHz Band License Scheduled for January 16, 2008, 72 Fed. Reg. 
48,272 (Aug. 23, 2007). 
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would take place on January 24, 2008.26 Up for grabs were a series of licenses for 
the 698–806 MHz band (commonly referred to as the 700 MHz band) of the 
electromagnetic spectrum.27 This band of the spectrum had been freed up by the 
FCC’s requirement that all “full-power television stations . . . broadcast exclusively 
in a digital format.”28 As a result, all of the analog television stations moved off this 
band of spectrum, leaving it vacant and available for allocation.29 
The 700 MHz band was especially attractive to wireless companies because it 
could carry wireless signals three to four times further than other bands of spectrum, 
translating to greater wireless coverage for the majority owner of the spectrum.30 The 
spectrum itself contained five “blocks” in all: Blocks A, B, C, D, and E; Block C, 
however, was the most sought-after section of the spectrum.31 It was the largest of 
all of the blocks, spanning 22 MHz, and it would be the main prize of the FCC’s 
auction.32 The auction was held in January 2008, and Verizon came out the big 
winner, spending $9.63 billion total—$4.75 billion of that amount going toward the 
purchase of a majority share of the coveted C-Block.33 
B. The Rules and Verizon’s Promise to Abide 
Now that it has been shown how Verizon Wireless came to be the majority owner 
of the C-Block, this subpart will briefly discuss the C-Block rules and their origins. 
On August 10, 2006, the FCC began “seeking comment on the possibility of revising 
a variety of licensing and service rules affecting . . . spectrum in the [700] MHz 
band[].”34 In response to this call for comments, Skype Communications S.A.R.L. 
(“Skype”) submitted a lengthy comment asking the FCC to extend and enforce its 
Carterfone provisions on the entire 700 MHz band.35 Carterfone was a 1968 FCC 
decision36 that held consumers had the right to attach a device to a wireline network 
                                                                                                                 
 
 26. Auction of 700 MHz Band Licenses Scheduled for January 24, 2008, 72 Fed. Reg. 
62,360 (Nov. 2, 2007). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Digital Television, FCC.GOV, http://www.fcc.gov/digital-television. 
 29. See id.; see also Chris Ziegler, The FCC’s 700 MHz Auction: What You Need To 
Know, ENGADGET (Jan. 24, 2008, 12:01 AM), http://www.engadget.com/2008/01/24/the-fccs
-700mhz-auction-what-you-need-to-know/. 
 30. See Grant Gross, A Primer on the FCC’s 700 MHz Auction, PCWORLD (Dec. 3, 2007, 
7:00 PM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/140245/article.html. 
 31. Ziegler, supra note 29. 
 32. See id.; see also Gross, supra note 30. 
 33. See FCC, FCC 700 MHZ BAND AUCTION, ATTACHMENT A (2008), available at 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-08-595A2.pdf; Michael Finneran, 700 
MHz Winners and Non-Winners, UNIFIED COMM. STRATEGIES (Mar. 21, 2008), 
http://www.ucstrategies.com/detail.aspx?id=2636. 
 34. Service Rules for the 698–746, 747–762 and 777–792 MHz Bands, 71 Fed. Reg. 
57,455, 57,455 (proposed Sept. 29, 2006). 
 35. Petition To Confirm a Consumer’s Right To Use Internet Communications Software 
and Attach Devices to Wireless Networks, Skype Commc’ns S.A.R.L., RM-11361 (FCC Feb. 
20, 2007) [hereinafter Skype Petition], available at http://newamerica.net/files/Skype
%20Petition.pdf. 
 36. Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Tel. Serv., 13 F.C.C.2d 420 (1968). 
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as long as “their access cause[d] no technical harm to carrier networks.”37 Skype 
encouraged the FCC to extend this ruling on wireline networks to wireless networks, 
like the one that Verizon operates.38 Following Skype’s petition, the Public Interest 
Spectrum Coalition (PISC) submitted various rule proposals for governing the 700 
MHz band.39 The most pertinent suggestion (like Skype’s) revolved around the 
implementation of open-access rules.40 PISC argued that wireless companies 
“routinely choke bandwidth to users, cripple features, and control the user 
experience.”41 PISC, along with Skype, Frontline Wireless, and others, proposed that 
open-access rules should be applied to all “60 MHz auctioned in the band” being 
employed for commercial use.42 
After a series of comment periods and research, the FCC, in August 2007, issued 
its Second Report and Order, containing an in-depth discussion on the 700 MHz 
band, the pending auction, and the various rules that would govern that spectrum.43 
In this document, FCC Chairman Kevin Martin declared that the Commission would 
be “impos[ing] certain conditions on the C Block . . . to provide open platforms for 
devices and applications.”44 Martin detailed a series of policy reasons for why the 
FCC had chosen not to apply these rules to all of the blocks and why the C-Block 
was the prime band of spectrum for this type of open-access requirement.45 Shortly 
after the Second Report and Order was issued, these open-access requirements were 
codified in the Code of Federal Regulations; the law required that licensees on the 
C-Block (Verizon) will “not deny, limit, or restrict the ability of their customers to 
use the devices and applications of their choice.”46 The law goes on to say that a 
C-Block licensee would only be able to exclude an application or device if the use of 
either “would not be compliant with published technical standards reasonably 
necessary for the management or protection of [Verizon’s] network.”47 Last, the rule 
elaborates on the term “technical standards,” saying they must be “reasonably 
necessary for third parties to access [Verizon’s] network . . . without causing 
objectionable interference to other spectrum users or jeopardizing network security.”48 
This particular aspect of the rules did not sit well with Verizon.49 To voice its 
opposition, Verizon elected to file a lawsuit against the FCC, contending that these 
                                                                                                                 
 
 37. Rob Frieden, Hold the Phone: Assessing the Rights of Wireless Handset Owners and 
Carriers, 69 U. PITT. L. REV. 675, 686 (2008). 
 38. Skype Petition, supra note 35, at ii. 
 39. See Comments of the Ad Hoc Public Interest Spectrum Coalition, Service Rules for 
the 698–746, 747–762, and 777–792 MHz Bands, No. 06-150 (FCC May 23, 2007), available 
at https://www.publicknowledge.org/pdf/pisc-fcc-comments-20070523.pdf. 
 40. Id. at 12. 
 41. Id. at 7. 
 42. Id. at 12. 
 43. Service Rules for the 698–746, 747–762 and 777–792 MHz Bands, 22 FCC Rcd. 
15,289 (2007) (second report & order). 
 44. Id. at 15,363, para. 202. 
 45. Id. at 15,361–65, paras. 195–205. 
 46. 47 C.F.R. § 27.16(b) (2013). 
 47. 47 C.F.R. § 27.16(b)(1). 
 48. 47 C.F.R. § 27.16(c)(1). 
 49. See Tom Corelis, Verizon Sues FCC over Open-Access 700 MHz Rules, DAILYTECH (Sept. 
13, 2007, 8:59 PM), http://www.dailytech.com/Verizon+Sues+FCC+Over+Openaccess+700
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rules were arbitrary and capricious and violated the Communications Act of 1934, 
the U.S. Constitution, and the Administrative Procedure Act.50 However, after the 
courts denied fast-tracking Verizon’s suit, the company elected to drop it altogether, 
making certain cursory comments that it would abide by the C-Block rules.51 
The next couple months were rather quiet, with Verizon completing the purchase 
of the C-Block. However, Google—being both a manufacturer of devices and a 
designer of applications—had a substantial interest in ensuring that Verizon played 
by the rules, and it was not yet convinced that Verizon was going to obey.52 Based 
on these suspicions, Google petitioned the FCC, contending that Verizon intended 
to, among other things, “exclude its handsets from the open access condition,” and 
Google demanded that the FCC get Verizon’s word that it would obey the rules.53 
Immediately following Google’s petition to the FCC, Verizon made a curt statement: 
“Verizon Wireless . . . understood the FCC’s rules for using that spectrum in advance 
of the auction. . . . Of course we’ll abide by those rules.”54 Furthermore, the FCC had 
issued a statement that it would conduct another auction without these open-access 
requirements if the reserve for the C-Block was not met,55 yet Verizon went ahead 
and purchased the C-Block anyway. Both Verizon’s statement and its purchase of 
this band of spectrum demonstrate that the wireless company was fully aware of its 
obligations when it won the auction.56 If Verizon truly wanted to avoid these 
open-access rules, then it could have waited and purchased the C-Block when the 
FCC reauctioned the spectrum without those requirements. 
C. The 2012 Consent Decree Between the FCC and Verizon 
The next couple years came and went without any violation, and it seemed that 
Verizon truly did intend to play by the rules. But then, in mid-2011, tethering 
(mobile hotspot) applications began disappearing from the Android application 
(“app”) store.57 This upset millions of consumers and consumer organizations. As 
                                                                                                                 
 
+MHz+Rules/article8875.htm; Bryan Gardiner, Verizon Dumps on Open Access, Sues FCC, 
WIRED (Sept. 13, 2007, 8:52 PM), http://www.wired.com/business/2007/09/verizon-dumps-o/. 
 50. Petition for Review, Cellco P’ship v. FCC, No. 07-1359 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 10, 2007); 
see also Corelis, supra note 49. 
 51. Matthew Lasar, Google Holds Verizon’s Feet to Fire on 700MHz Open Access, ARS 
TECHNICA (May 6, 2008, 12:35 AM), http://arstechnica.com/uncategorized/2008/05/google
-holds-verizons-feet-to-fire-on-700mhz-open-access/ (“[T]he wireless giant has contented itself 
with making comments that suggest that the company will obey the open platform rule . . . .”). 
 52. Sandro Brusco, Giuseppe Lopomo & Leslie M. Marx, The ‘Google Effect’ in the 
FCC’s 700 MHz Auction, 21 INFO. ECON. & POL’Y 101, 103 (2009); see also Petition to 
Condition Grant, Application of Cellco P’ship d/b/a Verizon Wireless for 700 MHz C Block 
Spectrum Licenses, No. AUC-73 (FCC May 2, 2008) [hereinafter Google Petition]. 
 53. Google Petition, supra note 52, at 3, 8. 
 54. Lasar, supra note 11. 
 55. Service Rules for the 698–746, 747–762 and 777–792 MHz Bands, 22 FCC Rcd. 
15,289, 15,403–04, para. 313 (2007) (second report & order). 
 56. Lasar, supra note 11. 
 57. Matthew Tonner, Note, Tethering Applications and Open Internet Rules for the 
Mobile Broadband: Lessons from the FCC-Verizon Settlement, 35 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. 
L.J. 471, 481 (2013). 
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a result, Free Press, a media-reform organization, “filed an administrative 
complaint against Verizon on June 6, 2011, alleging that Google [which runs the 
Android app store] was acting at [Verizon’s] request.”58 A few months later, the 
FCC decided to delve into the issue further by “issu[ing] a letter of inquiry to 
Verizon on October 12, 2011.”59 
Over the next ten months, the FCC investigated the removal of these 
applications.60 The investigation revealed that “Verizon requested that Google 
remove 11 apps from its Android Marketplace.”61 And then, on July 31, 2012, the 
FCC issued a press release notifying the public that Verizon had agreed to pay $1.25 
million to put an end to the investigation.62 Along with the $1.25 million payment, 
Verizon agreed to notify the app store operators that tethering applications would 
now be allowed on its network.63 Additionally, Verizon agreed to implement a 
“compliance plan,”64 which required that 
• employees [would] receive training on compliance with the 
C Block rules; 
• future communications with application store operators regarding 
the availability of applications to Verizon Wireless customers 
[would] be reviewed in advance by legal counsel; and 
• Verizon [would] report any instances of noncompliance with the 
rule at issue that might occur during the two-year term of the plan.65 
Last, and perhaps most importantly, the FCC’s press release contained a 
statement by FCC Chairman Julius Genachowski: “Today’s action demonstrates 
that compliance with FCC obligations is not optional. The open device and 
application obligations were core conditions when Verizon purchased the 
C-block spectrum.”66 
Now that the groundwork has been laid for the C-Block rules, this Note will 
examine whether Verizon’s certification process violates the 2008 C-Block 
agreement between the FCC and Verizon Wireless. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 482. 
 60. Id. at 483; Mikey Campbell, Verizon To End Tethering App Blockage Following $1.25M 
FCC Settlement, APPLEINSIDER (July 31, 2012, 6:46 PM), http://appleinsider.com/articles/12/07
/31/verizon_to_end_tethering_app_blockage_following_125m_fcc_settlement. 
 61. Campbell, supra note 60. 
 62. Press Release, FCC, Verizon Wireless To Pay $1.25 Million To Settle Investigation 
into Blocking of Consumers’ Access to Certain Mobile Broadband Applications (July 31, 
2012), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-315501A1.pdf. 
 63. Id. (“Verizon . . . has committed to notifying the application store operator that it no 
longer objects to the availability of the tethering applications to C-Block network customers 
in the operator’s online market.”). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
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II. DOES MR. JARVIS DESERVE A REMEDY UNDER THE CURRENT C-BLOCK RULES, 
OR IS VERIZON LAWFULLY PROTECTING ITS NETWORK AND ITS USERS?67 
As mentioned above, Mr. Jarvis has good reason to be upset with Verizon;68 he 
possessed a working tablet but was unable to activate it on his network of choice. 
However, based on the letter of the law and overall spirit of the C-Block rules, 
Verizon’s certification process is not a violation of these rules as they are currently 
written.69 
A. The Letter and Interpretation of the Law 
The first reason why Verizon’s certification process does not violate the C-Block 
rules hinges on the term “reasonably necessary,” featured in the relevant section of 
the Code of Federal Regulations, and what that term tells us about the FCC’s 
intentions.70 As discussed above, the FCC allowed a licensee to block a device if it 
did not comply with published technical standards reasonably necessary for third 
parties to access the network without causing harm.71 To show why this language is 
so important, this Note will employ a canon of construction72 known as the new 
textualist theory.73 The new textualist theory of interpretation posits that lawmaking 
bodies have a reason for using certain language and that language is the best indicator 
of the enacting body’s intent.74 New textualists often “consult contemporary 
dictionaries” to interpret the language.75 
With this theory in mind, let’s first look at the term reasonable. Black’s Law 
Dictionary defines this word to mean “[f]air, proper, or moderate under the 
circumstances; sensible.”76 Furthermore, Black’s Law Dictionary says the word 
necessary implies something “[t]hat is needed for some purpose or reason.”77 
Combining the two definitions and applying the textualist theory in this context, it 
follows that the FCC intended the term reasonably necessary to mean a certification 
process that is “needed for some purpose” (to allow third parties to access the 
licensee’s network without causing harm), but only if it is “proper . . . under the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 67. See 47 C.F.R. § 27.16(b) (2013); see also Parrish, supra note 2 (quoting a public 
statement made by Verizon, which argued that “Verizon’s certification process . . . is a 
straightforward way to ensure that devices attached to the Verizon Wireless network do not 
harm the network or other users”). 
 68. See supra text accompanying note 1. 
 69. See Kellex, supra note 13 (arguing that the Internet made this a bigger deal than it 
really was and that the story ended when Verizon justified the delay by explaining its 
certification process). 
 70. See 47 C.F.R. § 27.16(b)(1). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Jacob Scott, Codified Canons and the Common Law of Interpretation, 98 GEO. L.J. 
341, 344 (2010) (“The ‘canons of construction’ are a set of background norms and conventions 
that are widely used by courts when interpreting statutes.”). 
 73. See id. at 348. 
 74. See id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1456 (10th ed. 2014). 
 77. Id. at 1192. 
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circumstances [or] sensible” for the licensee to do so. This textual analysis serves as 
substantive evidence that the FCC set an extremely low bar when establishing this 
requirement, because the FCC virtually leaves it to the licensee to establish what is 
proper or sensible.78 Therefore, if questioned by the FCC about this issue, Verizon 
would simply point to its public streamlined certification process79 and argue that the 
process is proper and sensible under the circumstances to protect the network and its 
users. The FCC would have an extremely difficult time rebutting that argument, due 
to how the law is written.80 
Second, the FCC has taken a case-by-case approach to determining what 
constitutes “reasonable network management,”81 which is virtually synonymous with 
the “reasonably necessary” standard pioneered in the C-Block rules.82 The definition 
of reasonable network management came to the forefront in 2008, when the FCC 
found that Comcast Corporation’s (“Comcast”) blocking of certain peer-to-peer 
connections violated “federal policies that protect the vibrant and open nature of the 
Internet.”83 The FCC had just recently concluded an investigation of Comcast’s 
practice of “selectively block[ing] specific types of connections known as 
peer-to-peer connections.”84 In defense of these allegations, Comcast argued that its 
blocking of the applications constituted reasonable network management.85 The FCC 
rejected Comcast’s defense, holding that Comcast’s practices were 
ill-tailored to serve [the] goal [of fighting network congestion]: they 
affect customers who are using little bandwidth simply because they are 
using a disfavored application; they are not employed only during times 
of the day when congestion is prevalent; the company’s equipment does 
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not target only those neighborhoods suffering from congestion; and a 
customer may use an extraordinary amount of bandwidth during periods 
of network congestion and will be totally unaffected so long as he does 
not utilize an application disfavored by Comcast.86 
This extended quote from the FCC’s press release is included to illustrate the fact 
that a company must do something very wrong to violate the reasonable network 
management requirement. It is difficult to argue that the FCC’s interpretation of this 
requirement sets anything but an extremely low bar.87 
It should be noted that Comcast later appealed this FCC decision; the case reached 
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.88 The D.C. 
Circuit held that the Commission did not have the power to “regulate an Internet 
service provider’s network management practices” through its ancillary authority 
under the Communications Act of 1934.89 However, the fact that the FCC did not 
have jurisdiction in that particular case does not affect the Commission’s 
interpretation of reasonable network management. Therefore, based on its prior 
interpretation, it is unlikely that the FCC would find Verizon, taking some additional 
months to certify a device, in violation of reasonable network management.90 
Having applied a textualist-theory approach to specific language in the 
regulations, and having examined the FCC’s prior interpretation of reasonable 
network management, this Note concludes it is unlikely that the FCC would find 
Verizon’s certification process in violation of the actual letter of the law. 
B. The Spirit of the Agreement 
Mr. Jarvis not only contended that Verizon was violating the letter of the law; he 
also contended its certification process was violating the “spirit” of the law.91 To 
analyze whether this argument has merit, the canons of construction suggest applying 
the intentionalist theory.92 This theory employs a “[c]areful study of the legislative 
process,”93 often viewing “extrinsic legislative sources as legitimate sources of 
authority.”94 Looking at extrinsic evidence to the actual C-Block rules, it is clear that 
the FCC meant to give the C-Block licensees ample wiggle room. In fact, there was 
an underlying notion consistently reinforced by the FCC’s actions and words: 
freedom.95 
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The first piece of evidence for this conclusion is the FCC’s recognition of the risks 
these rules could impose upon wireless companies.96 In its Second Report and Order, 
following its proclamation that it would enforce open-access rules, the FCC took 
time to note “the risks network operators face in protecting against harmful 
devices.”97 The Commission went on to clarify that, as a result of these risks, it would 
allow wireless providers to “use their own certification standards and processes,”98 
saying it was “reasonable for [a licensee] to maintain network control features that 
permit dynamic management of network operations . . . and to restrict use of the 
network to devices compatible with these network control features.”99 This spirit of 
freedom demonstrates that the FCC intended100 to give C-Block licensees ample 
liberty in defining their own certification processes. Thus, it is highly unlikely that 
the FCC would find Verizon’s process to be outside of this intended freedom.101 
The second piece of supporting evidence from the FCC’s Second Report and 
Order is derived from the fact that the Commission looked at the C Block as an 
experiment for these types of rules.102 The FCC confessed that it believed these 
requirements had a positive net public-interest benefit, but if the reserve price was 
not met, that failure would “provide sufficient evidence to conclude that [it had] 
weighed the public-interest balance incorrectly . . . indicat[ing] inherent problems 
with operating a wireless system under this type of open platform regime.”103 Further 
driving this point home, the FCC—in its justification for limiting these rules to the 
C-Block spectrum—stated that it could not “rule out the possibility that such . . . 
requirement[s] may have unanticipated drawbacks.”104 The fact that the FCC virtually 
stated that this was an experiment furthers the underlying notion expressed above: the 
FCC intended to give the C-Block winners freedom under these open-access rules.105 
The final piece of supporting evidence for this notion of freedom is the FCC’s 
repeated reference to establishing a balance with these open-access requirements.106 
The FCC proclaimed it was attempting to establish a “balanced spectrum policy that 
recognizes that, in certain instances, it may be necessary to vary the regulation of 
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spectrum use to achieve certain critical public interest objectives.”107 Furthermore, 
the FCC mentioned it was trying to “foster[] greater balance between device 
manufacturers and wireless service providers.”108 This notion of balance is prevalent 
throughout the FCC’s discussion of imposing these open-access requirements.109 
Therefore—much like the FCC’s recognition of the risks facing wireless 
providers110—the FCC’s goal of striking a balance among wireless providers, device 
manufacturers, and the American public shows (1) that the FCC wanted to give some 
wiggle room to the wireless providers and (2) that the certification process falls 
within the breadth of that wiggle room.111 
Taking the analysis of both the letter of the law and the spirit of the agreement, it 
is highly unlikely that the FCC would find Verizon’s certification process in violation 
of the C-Block rules. However, this conclusion does not end the debate. 
III. RECENT FCC DECISIONS, POLICY CONSIDERATIONS, AND FUTURE IMPLICATIONS 
SHOULD PRECLUDE VERIZON’S LENGTHY CERTIFICATION PROCESS 
Verizon’s certification process may not violate the original C-Block rules or the 
original spirit of the agreement, but there are numerous reasons why the FCC needs 
to take a stand on this issue. Mr. Jarvis and consumers everywhere deserve to have 
an FCC that is not afraid to defend the rights of consumers. This Part will show that 
the FCC’s 2012 Consent Decree, policy considerations, and future economic 
implications require the FCC to stand up to Verizon Wireless. 
A. The Shift in “Spirit” Caused by Language in the FCC’s Consent Decree 
As discussed in Part I.C of this Note, the FCC issued a Consent Decree in July 
2012, punishing Verizon for blocking tethering apps and “enforcing the 
pro-consumer open access obligations of the C Block rules.”112 The FCC, by issuing 
this Consent Decree, changed the spirit of the C-Block rules.113 
The language used in the FCC’s press release, detailing the different aspects of 
the agreement, supports this notion.114 Not only did FCC Chairman Julius 
Genachowski explicitly say that “compliance with [these] obligations is not 
optional,” the press release went on to say that Verizon “‘shall not deny, limit, or 
restrict the ability of [its] customers to use the devices and applications of their choice 
. . .’ subject to narrow exceptions.”115 The phrase “narrow exceptions” set an entirely 
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different tone than the term “reasonable network management.”116 This piece of 
language signified a shift in the FCC’s thinking regarding this term. Reasonable 
network management had officially been placed under an umbrella labeled “narrow 
exceptions.” Verizon’s lengthy certification process will have a much more difficult 
time passing as a narrow exception, as opposed to reasonable network management. 
There is additional language that signifies a shift in the FCC’s approach on the 
enforcement of these C-Block rules. As noted by Enforcement Bureau Chief P. 
Michele Ellison, “This case [is] the first of its kind in enforcing the pro-consumer 
open access obligations of the C Block rules.”117 The FCC’s punishment under the 
C-Block rules was a product of opportunity, but it also suggested the FCC was 
removing itself from the experimental phase of the C-Block rules. As noted in Part 
II.B of this Note, the FCC admitted that these types of requirements could have 
unanticipated drawbacks, and as a result, it was taking a tentative, cautious approach 
to this type of regulation.118 Therefore, it follows that the FCC had concluded that 
these open-access rules did not have unanticipated drawbacks and that it was ready 
to begin holding Verizon accountable under these regulations. The Consent Decree 
sent “a strong message about how much this Commission cares about rules [it] 
adopt[s] to protect consumers and promote competition.”119 This was the FCC 
proclaiming a new (and stronger) commitment to the enforcement of these rules.120 
As then-Congressman Henry A. Waxman said, “The FCC must continue to remain 
vigilant in enforcing its rules that protect consumers and promote innovation and 
competition online.”121 If the FCC allows Verizon to continue this charade of 
allowing devices onto its network whenever it deems fit, it will not be protecting 
consumers or promoting innovation, and it will be contravening the general spirit of 
the Consent Decree,122 as discussed above. 
B. FCC’s Established Policies and Verizon’s Violation of Those Policies 
In light of the change in spirit caused by the 2012 Consent Decree, there are various 
public-interest objectives that require the FCC to take a stand on this certification issue: 
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(1) competition in the device market, (2) access to broadband networks, (3) innovation 
and consumer choice in the device market, and (4) public demand. 
1. The “Public Interest” 
Since its very inception, the public interest has been at the forefront of the FCC’s 
mind, a catalyst underlying each and every rule passed by the FCC.123 This was 
evidenced by the fact that the Communications Act of 1934, which created the 
FCC,124 pioneered the notion that the interest of the public was exceptionally 
important.125 The Act went so far as to say, “It shall be the policy of the United States 
to encourage the provision of new technologies and services to the public.”126 This 
public-interest sentiment was the reason for the creation of the FCC; it was the FCC’s 
job to promote this general interest, and it remains the FCC’s job to this day.127 The 
Commission, when discussing its decision to implement the open-access rules for the 
C-Block, said that it believed these open-access rules were in the public interest and 
would “achieve certain critical public interest objectives.”128 
2. Verizon’s Certification Process Is Sabotaging Competition and 
Could Have Tremendous Consequences 
Verizon’s most blatant public-interest encroachment, as a result of its certification 
process, is its flagrant obstruction of competition in the mobile-device market. 
Competition is a public-interest policy objective that has been important since the 
beginning of the FCC. As communications scholar Jerry Kang wrote, “Since the 
beginning of the federal government’s regulation of [the] broadcast spectrum, it has 
been a basic tenet of the communications policy that ‘there be competition’” in all 
areas regulated by the FCC.129 And while the broadcast spectrum and the wireless 
spectrum are generally treated differently, the importance of this policy objective 
was not lost on the FCC when it was determining the rules for the C-Block.130 The 
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Commission was concerned about the lack of competition in the mobile-device 
marketplace, stating, “We have not found, however, that competition in the CMRS 
[Commercial Mobile Radio Services] marketplace is ensuring that consumers drive 
handset . . . choices . . . .”131 As a result, the FCC applied competition-stimulating, 
open-access rules by “removing some of the barriers that . . . handset/device 
manufacturers face in bringing new products to market [to forge a] greater balance 
between device manufacturers and wireless service providers.”132 
And, for the most part, these open-access rules have facilitated greater 
competition.133 However, Verizon’s certification process substantially hinders this 
newfound competition. To illustrate this point, consider again the blocking of the 
Nexus 7, along with another newly released tablet. Verizon, on November 5, 2013, 
announced that it would be selling its very own tablet.134 The tablet was dubbed the 
Ellipsis 7, was quickly certified on Verizon’s network (presumably because Verizon 
made it), and was out for sale two short days after its announcement. As if releasing 
a new tablet at this exact time was not obvious enough, “[t]he Ellipsis 7 has a 7-inch 
1280 x 800 pixel in-plane switching LCD screen, which makes it a direct competitor 
with Google’s excellent Nexus 7 tablet.”135 
This situation serves as a perfect example to show how Verizon’s certification 
process can be used—and is being used—to restrict competition. “The reason for 
Verizon’s delay in approving the Nexus 7 is now obvious: the company wants 
customers to purchase its own tablet rather than Google’s.”136 And the most 
disheartening aspect of this situation is that Verizon is allowed to do this under the 
current C-Block rules.137 There is nothing stopping Verizon from continually 
delaying the connection and usability of various tablets and smartphones, using its 
“rigorous certification process” as a justification, and then introducing its own tablet 
or smartphone around the same time. Consumers will be able to purchase Verizon’s 
tablet, and it will immediately run on the network, avoiding the headache that Jeff 
Jarvis was forced to endure with his Nexus 7. The implications of this possibility 
alone should force the FCC to act. If the FCC continues to allow Verizon to prioritize 
the connection of its own devices in the future, it could have substantial, crippling 
effects on competition in the mobile-device market. 
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3. Availability of Broadband Services 
Another public-interest objective, and one the FCC considered “most critical,”138 
was the “[r]apid deployment and ubiquitous availability of broadband services across 
the country.”139 This was one of the main reasons that the FCC imposed open-access 
requirements upon devices, arguing that these technologies are “evolving into 
multi-media devices capable of surfing the web, sending e-mails,” and various other 
uses.140 As a result of this evolution, the FCC found that opening up the playing field 
for device manufacturers to operate on as many networks as possible accomplished 
its public-interest objective by providing consumers with “more opportunities to 
access broadband services both at home and on the go.”141 
This is a commendable (and important) objective; however, Verizon’s lengthy 
certification process is clearly at odds with this objective. Referring back to Mr. 
Jarvis’s situation, he purchased the Nexus 7 soon after it was released and took it to 
a Verizon store to have it activated.142 Mr. Jarvis, a member of the public, had the 
hope and expectation that he would be able to use Google’s newest tablet to access 
the broadband service being offered by Verizon, but Verizon’s certification process 
prohibited him from doing so—despite the fact that the Nexus 7 did function on the 
network. Considering that the Nexus 7 was the “eighth-best-selling tablet on 
Amazon”143 in November 2013 and that Verizon Wireless had 144.8 million 
customers as of September 2012,144 it is fairly reasonable to infer that there were 
(conservatively) thousands of others in the same situation as Mr. Jarvis. Verizon’s 
certification process effectively prevents members of the public from accessing 
broadband services through their selected devices. And if the FCC continues to allow 
this type of certification process, more and more consumers will be deprived of 
access in similar situations, essentially discounting the “critical policy objective[]”145 
pioneered by the FCC. 
4. Innovation and Consumer Choice 
Another public-interest objective the FCC was attempting to accomplish revolved 
around innovation and consumer choice.146 The FCC stated, “[W]e believe that it is 
appropriate to take a measured step to encourage additional innovation and consumer 
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choice at this critical stage in the evolution of wireless broadband services . . . .”147 
The open-access rules were developed to remove certain barriers so device 
manufacturers would be more willing to innovate, knowing their devices could be 
placed on various open networks, thereby increasing the number of choices for 
consumers.148 While both innovation and consumer choice have increased since the 
enactment of these C-Block rules—evidenced by the exponential growth in tablet 
sales149—Verizon’s certification process continues to restrict both consumer choice 
and innovation. 
First, in terms of consumer choice, we return to Mr. Jarvis’s situation—serving as 
an anecdote for many going through similar problems—to give a very practical 
example of how Verizon’s certification process is restricting that choice. Mr. Jarvis 
selected the Nexus 7 as his device of choice, taking advantage of the innovation and 
freedom encouraged by the open-access rules.150 However, as a result of the 
certification process, Mr. Jarvis was unable to obtain a SIM card from Verizon to attach 
the tablet to its network.151 Verizon’s policy directly undermines consumer choice. 
Verizon customers everywhere are exercising their freedom of commercial choice, but 
if the FCC continues to allow Verizon to postpone device certification for months at a 
time, this consumer freedom will remain limited. In the words of Google, the process 
is “eviscerating the consumer benefits of the [open-access] condition.”152 
This constriction of consumer choice also hinders innovation. Barbara van 
Schewick, in her book Internet Architecture and Innovation, discusses the need for 
consumer choice to promote innovation.153 While van Schewick mainly discusses 
this need for innovation in the mobile-application market, all of her points readily 
apply to devices as well. In a related white paper, van Schewick notes, “[I]t is 
impossible to predict what future successful [devices] will be.”154 She goes on to say 
that “enabling users to choose the [devices] they prefer is at the heart of the 
mechanism that enables innovation under uncertainty to be successful.”155 In 
essence, giving the public the power to choose which devices they want to use aids 
in device innovation. Device manufacturers are able to look at the results of the 
market, identify the products that the public likes the most, and use this data to come 
up with even more innovative products in the future.156 
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Verizon’s lengthy certification process is constraining consumer choice; 
consequently, it is also hindering innovation in the device market. Looking at the 
case of the Nexus 7, consumers everywhere discovered that the tablet was unable to 
run on the Verizon network and began shying away from it.157 Therefore, Google 
received skewed results from the public market and could not accurately analyze what 
the public thought of its newest tablet. Insufficient market data limited the company’s 
ability to innovate in the future. As Skype predicted in its petition to the FCC, this type 
of restrictive certification process “creates an innovation bottleneck, as equipment 
manufacturers are forced to design equipment based on what carriers will allow [or 
certify], not necessarily what consumers want and the state-of-the-art will permit.”158 
Additionally, Verizon’s certification process is restricting innovation by 
“foster[ing] uncertainty and delay, rather than innovation and investment.”159 Former 
FCC Commissioner Michael J. Copps summed up the problem perfectly while 
describing the way restrictive processes, like Verizon’s certification process, can 
hinder innovation by invoking uncertainty: 
Let’s look at it from an inventor’s perspective. His or her job is to come 
up with the idea, go out and attract venture capital funding for it, and 
hopefully bring that innovation to consumers. Before they devote years 
of their lives, and ask investors to devote huge sums of money to their 
dream . . . [t]hey need to know that their innovation won’t be prevented 
from getting to market . . . . Inventors and creators need to know, 
up-front, that they have the right to innovate without going on bended 
knee to seek permission from a few who have amassed too much control 
in their own hands.160 
Former Commissioner Copps believes that inventors need to know their hard 
work will pay off, instead of being stymied or hindered by wireless companies after 
putting in countless hours to create a product.161 If inventors have this worry, they 
will be less likely to innovate; in this way, Verizon’s certification process is 
hindering innovation. Device manufacturers around the world will look at the Nexus 
7 as an example, recognizing that their hard work in creating a device could easily 
be halted for months while Verizon takes its sweet time certifying the device under 
the guise of reasonable network management. Verizon’s process casts a shadow of 
uncertainty over device manufacturers, which is precisely what the FCC was 
attempting to abrogate with these rules.162 As Mr. Jarvis aptly stated in another 
complaint to the FCC, allowing “Verizon to hide behind its claim of a right to certify 
                                                                                                                 
 
 157. I was unable to find concrete statistics to support this notion. However, in my opinion, 
it is a safe assumption that consumers figuring out the tablet doesn’t run on a certain network 
(especially Verizon customers) would result in them avoiding that tablet and looking 
elsewhere. 
 158. Skype Petition, supra note 35, at 13. 
 159. Google Petition, supra note 52, at 7. 
 160. Broadband Network Management Practices, En Banc Hearing Before the FCC (2008) 
(statement of Michael J. Copps, Commissioner, FCC), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov
/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-281625A1.pdf. 
 161. See id. 
 162. See id. 
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only brings needless confusion to the Commission’s rules and rulings about open 
networks.”163 Unless the FCC’s stated commitment to innovation and consumer 
choice was an empty promise, these policies require the Commission to forbid 
Verizon from employing its existing certification process. 
5. For the Sake of Public Interest, This Is What the Public Wants 
“Gathering and analyzing comments from the public is an important part of the 
Federal Communications Commission’s rulemaking process. The FCC considers the 
public’s input when developing rules and policies.”164 Given the FCC’s express 
interest in public comment, it is troubling that the Commission has not thus far 
responded to the outcry from consumers like Jarvis.165 
Aside from Mr. Jarvis’s various formal complaints, there is a large contingent of 
consumers who do not agree with Verizon’s process and want to see a change. A 
BuzzMachine (blog) user had the same questions as Mr. Jarvis, writing, “If LTE 
devices designed to work with  [Verizon Wireless’s] network are built using a 
published specification, what possible testing is necessary?”166 Another user on the 
website CNET voiced the same concern: “Verizon agreed when they leased the 
spectrum that it would be open (as they have no legal choice). There is no reason for 
this certification if the [LTE specification] is followed, and by doing this Verizon is 
violating the terms of the agreement . . . .”167 Another user went so far as 
characterizing the certification process as a front to cover malicious motives, using 
the certification process to nitpick and find ways to keep other devices off of its 
network.168 There are numerous comments across the Internet urging Mr. Jarvis to 
continue this fight, recognizing that change is needed.169 
Hundreds of additional comments—similar to the ones expressed above—could 
be used to further illustrate this point, but these four sufficiently signify that the 
public wants Verizon to change its practices. If public comments truly are “an 
important part of the [FCC’s] rulemaking process,”170 then the Commission needs to 
take note of the public outcry concerning this certification process and make a 
change: public interest demands it. 
IV. PROPOSAL FOR A RETROACTIVE CERTIFICATION PROCESS 
There is no denying that the FCC’s open-access rules have done an immense 
amount of good, helping to provide consumers with more devices and applications 
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than ever before.171 However, the FCC, from the beginning, openly admitted that these 
rules were experimental in nature;172 the Commission was hoping to learn lessons along 
the way and would adapt its enforcement of the rules accordingly.173 The FCC’s 
punishment of Verizon for the blockage of tethering apps under the Consent Decree of 
2012 was “the first of its kind in enforcing the pro-consumer open access obligations 
of the C Block rules.”174 It was the FCC’s first step in adapting its enforcement of these 
rules, and it is time for the Commission to take another important step. 
The FCC should amend the current C-Block rules to continue this adaptation of 
enforcement and to advance the policies discussed in this Note. The Commission 
should continue to allow Verizon to create and conduct its own certification process, 
but that certification process must be retroactive, as opposed to prophylactic.175 The 
FCC must require Verizon to publish the technical standards for devices attempting 
to operate on the wireless company’s network, as required by section 27.16(b)(1) of 
the current C-Block rules.176 Device manufacturers would then be required to provide 
written justification to show that their device complies with the wireless company’s 
published technical standards. An independent body within the FCC must be 
established to review the device manufacturer’s justification prior to the device being 
released. At the same time, the device manufacturer must provide Verizon with a 
testing device that the wireless company can then run through its self-defined 
certification process. 
Upon release of the device, purchasers of the tablet or smartphone would be 
allowed to connect to the network by obtaining a SIM card from Verizon. In the event 
a device is found to bring harm to the network (either through consumer use or the 
certification process), Verizon would be required to provide an explanation of the 
harm to the FCC’s independent body and the general public—preferably through a 
press release. The FCC would then allow Verizon to temporarily deactivate the SIM 
cards within the problem-causing devices. Verizon would then be given a reasonable 
amount of time to correct the problem or, if the problem is unable to be corrected, 
deem that the device can no longer run on the network. Should Verizon conclude that 
the device can no longer run on the network, it would provide the FCC with an in-
depth analysis of the problem, along with a substantive justification as to why it 
cannot be remedied. 
This proposal reinforces the shift in spirit caused by the 2012 Consent Decree and 
protects the policy objectives that the C-Block rules were seeking to promote. It once 
again sends a message to Verizon that these rules are not to be taken lightly and that 
the FCC will continue to do everything in its power to protect consumer rights. 
Furthermore, this approach provides a well-balanced—but consumer friendly—
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compromise between the Commission and the wireless company. This proposal 
allows the FCC to better promote competition, innovation, and access to broadband 
networks, while also giving consumers the freedom they desire—being able to 
choose whichever device and network they prefer. Additionally, this proposal 
considers and is sympathetic toward “the risks network operators face in protecting 
against harmful devices”177 by allowing Verizon to continue to define its own 
certification process, making the device manufacturers provide justification that their 
devices are in compliance, and allowing the wireless company to deactivate devices 
that prove harmful. Verizon is empowered to protect its network and its users without 
compromising the proconsumer rights furthered by the open-access rules. 
CONCLUSION 
The enactment of the C-Block open-access rules was a substantial step in 
furthering various public-interest policy objectives, giving consumers more rights in 
the mobile-device market than ever before. However, Verizon’s delay in certifying 
the Nexus 7 signifies that, while the C-Block rules were a substantial step, the FCC 
needs to continue to adapt its enforcement to promote these policy objectives more 
effectively. If the Commission refuses to act in this situation, Verizon’s certification 
process will continue to undermine the objectives the FCC was attempting to 
promote with these rules. 
As the FCC said when discussing its policy goals, “[T]he emphasis must be first 
and foremost on the interest, the convenience, and the necessity of the . . . public, 
and not on the interest, convenience, or necessity of the individual [wireless 
company].”178 Amending the rules to use a retroactive certification process is the 
perfect way to show a true commitment to this sentiment: it places the public interest 
above the wireless company’s interest, but it does so without taking away Verizon’s 
right to protect its network. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 
 177. Service Rules for the 698–746, 747–762 and 777–792 MHz Bands, 22 FCC Rcd. 
15,289, 15,371, para. 223 (2007) (second report & order). 
 178. 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review, 18 FCC Rcd. 13,620, 13,641 (2003) (alterations 
added and in original) (quoting FCC’s predecessor, the Federal Radio Commission). 
